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IS AMENDMENT 2 REALLY A BILL OF 
AT TAINDER? SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT 
PROFESSOR AMAR'S ANALYSIS OF ROMER 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.* 
As I first discovered as a law student in Professor Amar's classes 
on legal history and federal courts, it is generally an intellectual treat to 
listen to Professor Amar's legal analysis, even when he is attacking 
one's own arguments. So my pleasure at reading Professor Amar's anal­
ysis of the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans was only partly damp­
ened by his disapproval of the respondents' brief that I and other plain­
tiffs' counsel filed with the Court. According to Amar, this respondents' 
brief provided the Court with "so little help" that it had to rely on an 
entirely different and much sounder argument - an argument rooted in 
the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on attainder,1 contained in Article I, 
sections 9 and 10. 
Amar maintains that (1) contrary to Justice Scalia's vituperative 
dissent, the attainder argument provides an intellectually compelling ba­
sis for believing that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional, and (2) the 
Romer decision, correctly interpreted, adopted precisely this argument. 
Amar's revival of the Attainder Clauses is classically Amaresque: it 
talces constitutional text and structure seriously and it provides an origi­
nal and sensitive reading of specific constitutional clauses and a careful 
understanding of their structural relationships. 
However, as much as I appreciate his elegant and astute reading of 
the Attainder Clauses, I think in the end that his application of these 
clauses to Amendment 2 and his reading of Romer are unconvincing. 
The difficulty with his argument is that, as Amar notes, the Attainder 
Clauses prohibit state and federal legislation from "naming persons and 
singling them out for distinctive treatment."2 As explained below, a law 
"names " persons only if it defines a closed class of persons with some 
fixed characteristic - a class the entire membership of which could be 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1987, J.D. 1991, Yale. 
- Ed. The author was one of several attorneys who represented the plaintiff-respon­
dents in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
1. Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. 
L. REv. 203, 222 (1996). 
2. Id. at 213 (emphasis added). 
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known (at least in theory) by the legislators at the moment when the 
law is enacted. 
Amar provides no persuasive argument that the term "homosexual, 
lesbian, or bisexual orientation" denotes such a closed class. To make 
such an argument, he would have to show that sexual orientation is not 
merely a status, but also an irreversible status, a characteristic that does 
not change over time and that thereby defines a closed class from which 
members cannot exit and nonmembers cannot enter. Rather than attempt 
such an argument, Amar argues that Amendment 2 discriminates on the 
basis of "status" rather than "conduct " and thus "targets persons for 
who they are, not what they have done. "3 But this status-conduct dis­
tinction is irrelevant to the issue raised by the Attainder Clauses - the 
issue of whether Amendment 2 names persons by designating them as a 
closed class, the entire membership of which could be known by the 
legislature. 
Amar's emphasis on the status-conduct decision is mischievous not 
merely because it misconstrues the Attainder Clauses but also because 
the distinction is, in a larger sense, deeply misguided: although the dis­
tinction repeatedly surfaces in gay rights litigation,4 it is practically triv­
ial and intellectually incoherent. Indeed, this is why neither the respon­
dents' brief, nor Professor Tribe's amicus brief, nor- as I shall explain 
below - the Romer Court relied on such a distinction. Amendment 2 
would be a deprivation of equal protection - although not an attaint -
even if the term "orientation " were omitted from its text. For, as Romer 
and respondent's brief repeatedly state (and as Amar curiously ignores), 
the central flaw in Amendment 2 is not its ambiguous and probably 
severable mention of "orientation" but rather its breadth, its imposition 
of a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,"5 
3. Id. at 217. 
4. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 64-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993), revd. en bane, 
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Department of De­
fense's regulations imputing persons on homosexual status, not conduct, were repugnant 
to common law and constitutional principles); Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 
1428, 1434-35, 1451, different result reached on rehg., 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990) (holding that the Army's regulations, under 
which "homosexuality" - not sexual conduct - was the operative trait for disqualifi­
cation, were unconstitutional because they discriminated against persons of homosexual 
orientation, a suspect class); Jantz v. Muci, 159 F. Supp. 1543, 1546-47, 1551 (D. Kan. 
1991) revd., 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that a governmental classification 
based on an individual's sexual orientation is inherently suspect, while noting that most 
courts have found that persons engaging in homosexual conduct do not constitute a sus­
pect class). As these examples suggest, the status-conduct distinction has not fared well 
as a way of vindicating gay rights: at best, it is accepted by lower courts or appellate 
panels only to be rejected on appeal or en bane. 
5. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). 
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regardless of whether the group is defined by conduct or orientation. It 
is the sheer breadth of Amendment 2 that makes it constitutionally sus­
pect, and not some burden on "orientation" as opposed to "conduct." 
In the following pages, I will first attempt to explain the scope and 
purposes underlying the Constitution's clauses forbidding bills of attain­
der. Then I will show that the distinction between "orientation" and 
"conduct" - or "status" and "conduct" - really has nothing whatso­
ever to do with this principle. Finally, I will try to show that, like re­
spondent's brief, Romer depends crucially on the breadth of Amend­
ment 2 - the wide category of antidiscrimination laws that 
Amendment 2 preempted. It is this breadth, and not any use of the term 
"orientation" that led the Court to invalidate Amendment 2. 
I. 
First, let me start where I think that Amar and I agree: What is at­
tainder, and why is it suspicious? 
As Amar notes, at the core of the rules against attainder is the no­
tion that "[a] law naming persons and singling them out for distinctive 
treatment is suspicious. "6 The fundamental principle underlying the rule 
is that the state and federal legislatures must make policy by "generally 
applicable rule[s]"7 rather than by laws that single out groups or per­
sons by name - what the Court calls "specifically designated persons 
or groups. "8 Thus, the most obvious violation of the rule against attain­
der is a statute that literally designates individuals by their proper 
names - for instance, a law stating, "Akhil Amar is barred from hold­
ing public office." Amar is surely correct that the Attainder Clauses 
would also bar the Congress from using definite descriptions for the 
same purpose as a proper name: it would equally be unconstitutional for 
Congress to declare that "all persons who wrote an article entitled Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism will be barred from public office," for the 
definite description obviously serves the purpose of singling out a spe­
cific individual and no one else. Moreover, Amar must also be correct 
that a law can be a bill of attainder if it designates a specific group of 
persons: so, for instance, a law barring "all members of the Amar fam­
ily" from holding public office would be an attainder just as much as if 
each member of the family were individually listed in the text of the 
statute. 
6. Amar, supra note 1, at 213 (emphasis added). 
7. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965). 
8. 381 U.S. at 447. 
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From these uncontroversial propositions, Amar makes the in­
sightful observation that the rule against attainder is actually "a proto­
type of the Equal Protection Clause: "9 the rule limits the ability of the 
legislature to single out disfavored groups and thereby prevents depriva­
tion of equal legal protections. As Amar notes, a law barring "all per­
sons of East Indian descent " from holding public office would be just 
as much of an attainder as a law barring "the Amar family " from hold­
ing public office. For such a law would "specifically designate[] " a 
group of persons and no one else for disfavored treatment just as much 
as a law penalizing an entire family.10 Indeed, the analogy between ra­
cial and familial classifications is extraordinarily close: both are legal 
relationships defined by lineal descent, ancestry, or blood line. 
But Amar's astute analogy between the rule against attainder and 
the rule against deprivations of equal protection is not just an insight 
but a warning: there is a danger that the concept of attainder can be­
come just as murky and incoherent as concepts of equal protection, 
bogged down in " 'free-form' constitutionalism "  which Amar rightly 
disparages but that has notoriously plagued equal protection law. The 
problem is that, while the rule against attainder prohibits laws that im­
pose punishment on "specifically designated persons or groups,"11 we 
do not really have a clear notion of what it means to "specifically " des­
ignate something or someone. Of course, proper names are the easiest 
case.12 But, as we have seen, they are not the only sort of "specificity " 
that the anti-attainder rule prohibits. Laws that burden "members of the 
Communist Party" or "former rebels against the United States govern­
ment " are also too "specific. " But then what exactly is not "too spe­
cific "? What passes muster as a "generally applicable rule"? As Pro­
fessor Tribe has noted, "the concept of legislative 'specification' . .. 
cannot be so broad as to swallow up all laws that impose some disa­
bling limitation upon an ascertainable group. "13 Could a law impose 
regulatory burdens on "the catfood industry "? "Fly fishermen "? "Per­
sons under six feet in height"? 
Unfortunately, Amar does not provide a criterion for defining ille­
gal legislative specification - illegal "naming" - beyond stating that 
laws cannot "target[] persons for who they are " on the basis of their 
9. Amar, supra note 1, at 215. 
10. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447. 
11. 381 U.S. at 447. 
12. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
13. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 10-4, at 644 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
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"status."14 This is a little vague: what does it mean exactly to target 
persons "for who they are?" All laws, after all, distinguish between 
persons based on their characteristics - frequently including character­
istics like age and handicap that are involuntary, personal traits. And 
these characteristics seem to be a part of what identifies persons as 
"who they are." 
I think that one can provide a more precise account of what it 
means to "name" a person or group. The essence of such "naming" -
such illegal legislative specification - is that the legislation defines a 
closed class, a class with a membership that is permanently fixed when 
the class is defined, from which members can never exit and into which 
nonmembers can never enter, as a matter of law. Logic, precedent, and 
policy suggest that the Attainder Clauses forbid such closed classes and 
nothing else. 
Consider, first, the logic of proper names. The essence of naming 
is to designate a unique person or group of persons to which anyone not 
so designated can never belong. Unlike a general term, a name func­
tions like a telephone number or address in that it designates one item 
or set of items and no others, without attempting to say anything more 
about the items.15 W hen I use the name "Akhil Amar," I intend to refer 
to a specific person and to no one else (not even to other people who 
might, by coincidence, have the same name). Likewise, ifl refer to "all 
persons who aided the Confederacy during the Civil War," I name a 
closed class of persons that can, by definition, never include another 
member aside from the members denoted when the term is used. 
Note that legal classifications defined by birth or parentage - le­
gitimacy, alienage, or race - are a special type of closed class. As a 
matter of law, one's race does not change, for the law generally defines 
race by one's parentage: burdens on racially defined classes will, by 
definition, never fall upon persons outside such classes because parent­
age, like other past events, is unchangeable as a matter of law.16 But, 
what is worse, racial classifications, being legally hereditary conditions, 
14. Amar, supra note 1, at 217. 
15. This assertion about names hides a great deal of semantic complexity, which is 
explored by a field of philosophy sometimes termed "reference theory." In my argu­
ment, I use the term "name" in roughly the same way that Saul Kripke uses the term 
"rigid designator." For some seminal accounts of proper names and general terms, see 
SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1977) and HlLARY PuTNAM, The 
Meaning of 'Meaning,' in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE, AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PA­
PERS 215 (1975). 
16. Note that this unchangeability has nothing to do with whether race is somehow 
"immutable" in any biological sense: race is considered here only as a legal concept, 
not a biological fact 
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target not merely specific groups of presently existing individuals but 
also specific groups of families and lines of familial descent. It is as if 
the law contained a list of proper familial names rather than individual 
names. Such a legal burden will be transmitted lineally from parent to 
child, insuring that the descendants of the legislators' enemies. will be 
burdened and the children of the legislators' friends will be exempt. 
Thus, the prohibition against racial discrimination contained implicitly 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, as Amar notes, has deep antecedents in 
Article I's prohibitions ori attainder and titles of nobility and Article ill, 
section 3 's prohibition on corruption of blood. 
Consider also judicial precedent. In determining whether the mem­
bers of a legislative class are "easily ascertainable" and therefore ille­
gally specified or "named," the Court asks whether the class's member­
ship is irreversibly fixed on enactment or whether exit and entry into 
the class is possible after the law's enactment. For instance, in Selective 
Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 17 the 
Court held that a federal statute denying educational assistance to stu­
dents who failed to register for the draft, did not attaint such students 
because such students could escape the law's burdening simply by reg­
istering in accordance with the law. By contrast, the Court noted that 
the laws at issue in Cummings 18 and Garland, 19 barring former Con­
federate sympathizers from being licensed for various professions, were 
bills of attainder because they created "absolute barriers" to exit from 
the class: "no one who had served the Confederacy could possibl[y] 
comply [with the licensing requirement], for his status was irreversi­
ble. "20 In short, the Attainder Clauses do not necessarily bar legal bur­
dens based on status per se, but rather classifications based on "irre­
versible" status - that is, on legally closed classifications with a 
membership that is, therefore, permanently fixed upon enactment. 
What policy might be served by such a rule against closed classes? 
Amar provides us with the answer: closed classes tear away the "veil of 
ignorance" that should normally accompany legislation and thus invite 
corrupt legislative purposes to infect lawmaking.21 Closed classes pierce 
this veil of ignorance by insuring that the legislators will know the 
identities of everyone who will ever be burdened by legislation. By us­
ing these closed classes, a legislator can ensure that a legislative burden 
will be imposed only on persons that she dislikes and no one else -
17. 468 U.S. 841 (1984). 
18. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
19. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). 
20. 468 U.S. at 850-51 (emphasis added). 
21. See Amar, supra note 1, at 210. 
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that the classification will never inadvertently "spill over," as it were, 
on to political allies. Therefore, legislation containing closed classes en­
ables legislatures to launch "surgical strikes" against unpopular groups, 
confident that such burdens will not affect favored constituents upon 
whom the legislator depends.22 
But why require such a veil of ignorance at all? Why must the leg­
islature be forced through the use of open classes to be minimally im­
partial? There is a deep constitutional tradition that governmental deci­
sions cannot rest on a mere desire to impose costs on one person or 
group for the benefit of another person or group; the identity of the bur­
dened persons ought to be irrelevant to the purpose of the burden.23 
This tradition of minimal impartiality is enforced in some contexts, 
such as adjudication, through institutional design. For instance, judges 
have life tenure, are bound by precedent, and are conditioned to limit 
their own discretion by various forms of professional indoctrination; 
likewise, ex parte contacts are forbidden; reasons for decisions must be 
provided on a record; evidence must be presented in a controlled set­
ting; and so forth. 
In the legislative context, however, these sorts of institutional con­
straints are necessarily missing. The Attainder Clause's prohibition on 
closed classes preserves a minimal degree of impartiality that is other­
wise impossible to guarantee in the legislative context through institu­
tional design. The veil of ignorance in the legislative chambers, in ef­
fect, replaces the blindfold on the face of Justice in the courtroom, and 
creates a different sort of blindness that accomplishes the same sort of 
effect - a minimal degree of impartiality. 
II. 
In light of this summary of Attainder Clause jurisprudence, it is 
easy to see why Amar's argument against Amendment 2 based on the 
Attainder Clause faces some serious obstacles. Quite simply, it is at 
22. Note that open classes preserve the veil of ignorance in that, at least in theory, 
the legislator using such classes can never predict whether or not she or her favored 
constituents will end up being burdened by the law: legislators who vote for a law re­
quiring the imprisonment of "embezzlers" or the constituents who support such legisla­
tors cannot know for sure whether they themselves might not some day end up being 
indicted under the law. (Impossible? Ask Dan Rostenkowski.) The membership of the 
class "embezzlers" is not logically fixed by a finite number of names of individuals or 
family lines when it is enacted into law. Thus, if legislators are forced to forego closed 
classes, they will have an incentive to moderate their partiality toward themselves and 
their particular constituent coalition . 
23. For a general discussion of this tradition, see CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION 17-39 (1993). 
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least unclear that the class contained in Amendment 2 - persons with 
"homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or re­
lationships " - is a closed class that pierces the legislative veil of 
ignorance. 
Amar emphasizes that Amendment 2 specifically does not cover 
persons of heterosexual orientation.24 This is true, but, depending on 
how homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation is defined, it is irrele­
vant. For it might be the case that the phrase "homosexual orientation " 
refers to an inclination, desire, urge, and so on, that anyone in Colorado 
can have or cease to have at any time, much like a desire to hunt elk, 
drive red sports cars, smoke, eat junk food, forge checks, cheat on one's 
spouse, or marry more than one person. That is, "being a gay person " 
might be like "being a pedestrian" - something that each person be­
comes some of the time but that no one is all of the time. If homosex­
ual orientation designates a mutable mental state that might potentially 
affect any and all persons from time to time - analogous to "adulter­
ous orientation " or "polygamous orientation" - then the membership 
of the class covered by Amendment 2 was not fixed when the law was 
enacted. In theory, the proponents of Amendment 2 themselves could be 
burdened by Amendment 2, if and when they experienced homosexual 
orientation. 
Perhaps sensing that his interpretation of the term "orientation " in 
Amendment 2 is tendentious, Amar offers some occasional statements 
of empirical fact about the nature of sexual orientation. He asserts that 
"desires, fantasies, thoughts, urges, and drives" are "often" impossible 
to "prevent or control, "25 and he asserts that "we are not all equally 
likely tomorrow to wake up and feel gay. "26 At least the second of 
these statements27 seems to suggest that "homosexual orientation "  must 
denote a closed class; Amar seems to be asserting that, as an empirical 
matter, one subset of the population has a gay or lesbian orientation and 
the rest of the population does not. Thus, like the class of persons with 
blood type A or left-handedness,28 homosexual orientation denotes a 
24. See Amar, supra note 1, at 207. 
25. Id. at 218. 
26. Id. at 234. 
27. It is important to see that these statements make very different claims. The 
first statement is irrelevant to whether Amendment 2 contains a closed class, for it as­
serts only that homosexual orientation is involuntary. Perhaps it is. But if all persons are 
equally prone to involuntary feelings of same-sex attraction, then the involuntary nature 
of sexual orientation would not suggest that Amendment 2 creates any closed class. We 
are all prone to involuntary aging, but age classifications are not closed, for their mem­
bership shifts constantly. 
28. See Amar, supra note 1, at 226. 
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class smaller than the entire population of Colorado, the membership of 
which is fixed when Amendment 2 was enacted. 
One can concede the obvious: not all persons are equally likely to 
have a desire to engage in "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual . . . con­
duct, practices, or relationships. "29 But this empirical fact cannot con­
vert Amendment 2's reference to "orientation" into a closed class: not 
all of us are likely to wake up in the morning wanting to be investment 
bankers or to evade the draft. Nevertheless, laws burdening "investment 
bankers" or "draft evaders" do not thereby become attaints on the bur­
dened persons. The issue is whether Amendment 2 contains a term that 
functions as a proper name - a term denoting some characteristic that, 
by definition, only an identified subset of the population can potentially 
possess. 
If one looks to the intent of a law's proponents to discern whether 
a term in a law designates specific groups or persons with a closed 
class, then it is not obvious that Amendment 2 contains a closed class. 
Judging from the statements of the proponents of Amendment 2, the 
term "homosexual orientation" was not intended to serve as a closed 
class. Rather, Colorado for Family Values and the State of Colorado 
both repeatedly asserted that homosexual orientation was a fluid rather 
than an immutable characteristic: "gay persons" could lose it30 and 
there was always the danger that heterosexuals could be seduced into 
deserting their spouses and becoming gay or lesbian by the example of 
openly homosexual conduct. That was, indeed, why they so feared "gay 
rights:" the State argued that such rights would encourage more people 
to "become gay. "31 
Note that this legislative intent distinguishes homosexual orienta­
tion from, say, racial classifications. Racial classifications are under­
stood by legislators who enact them to be legally hereditary characteris­
tics fixed at birth and unchanging thereafter as a matter of law. By 
contrast, the ratifiers of Amendment 2 apparently regarded the category 
29. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30(b)). 
30. See, e.g., Affidavit of Charles W. Socarides, M.D.,
· 
Evans v. Romer, Civ. A. 
No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Dec. 14, 1993) (order granting pre­
liminary injunction) (expert testimony regarding the possibility of ridding individuals of 
homosexual inclination through psychiatric treatment); Testimony of James Nicolosi, 
Evans, 1993 WL 518586 (preliminary injunction hearing) (expert testimony regarding 
the success in ridding formerly homosexual persons of homosexual desire through 
counseling); COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, VOTE YES ON AMENDMENT 21 
(1992) (pamphlet urging passage of amendment 2). 
31. See Petitioners' Opening Brief at 40 n.59, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 
(Colo. 1994) (Nos. 945A48, 945A128) (arguing that Amendment 2 is necessary to pre­
serve heterosexual marriages from the "specter of sexual competition" presented by the 
possibility of homosexual relationships). 
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of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual persons" as more like the category 
of alcoholics or habitual smokers: anyone could fall into, or be re­
deemed out of, the class. 
Given the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, one easily might 
regard this view of Amendment 2's proponents as empirically ground­
less.32 However, if bills of attainder are forbidden because they target 
specific persons, then one arguably should look to the intentions of the 
ratifiers of Amendment 2 and not some empirical fact about sexual ori­
entation to determine whether Amendment 2 illegally names any spe­
cific group. If the ratifiers of Amendment 2 believed that anyone - in­
cluding themselves - could become gay or lesbian, then such a belief 
might suggest that they did not have any improper purpose to target a 
discrete subpart of the population.33 
In any case, even if one resolved the issue by·reference to empiri­
cal evidence concerning human sexuality, it is not obvious that sexual 
orientation is a fixed trait like, for example, blood type. Quite apart 
from the proponents of Amendment 2, many advocates of gay and les­
bian rights maintain that human sexual desire is more fluid than immu­
table.34 Moreover, the trial court in Romer had been equivocal on the is-
32. For the official positions of the American Psychological Association and the 
American Psychiatric Association concerning the origins of sexual orientation, see 
FACT SHEET: GAY AND LESBIAN ISSUES, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 
(1993) and Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Inc., for the Year 
1974, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 620, 633 (1975). For summaries of the literature sug­
gesting that sexual orientation is generally established at an early age and is highly re­
sistant to change, see RICHARD GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 62-86 
(1992) and Judd Mannor, Overview: The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in 
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 3 (Judd Mannor ed., 1980). 
Examples of literature suggesting a physiological or genetic root to sexual orientation 
include Dean Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome 
and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (July 16, 1993) and Simon LeVay, A 
Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 
SCIENCE 1034 (1991). Drs. Green, Hamer, and Mannor all testified at trial as expert 
witnesses for the plaintiffs in the Romer case. 
33. It is a debatable question whether the ratifiers actually had such a belief: de­
spite their assertions that sexual orientation was mutable, the proponents of Amendment 
2 may well have believed that persons with heterosexual inclinations could never have 
homosexual inclinations. However, to establish.that the phrase "homosexual . • •  orien­
tation" contained in Amendment 2 constituted a closed class, one would have to ana­
lyze what Amendment 2's proponents and ratifiers meant by this phrase. Such analysis 
would require some discussion of the assumptions, values, and purposes of Amendment 
2's proponents and ratifiers - their understanding of sexuality. Amar attempts no such 
analysis; in this respect, his argument based on the Attainder Clauses is seriously 
incomplete. 
34. See, e.g., John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in POWERS OF DE­
SIRE: THE PoLmcs OF SEXUALITY 100, 109 (Ann Snitnow et al. eds., 1983) 
("Claims made by gays and nongays that sexual orientation is fixed at an early age, that 
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sue: after listening to hours of testimony, the court refused to make 
findings on the causation or persistence of sexual orientation.35 
One central weakness of Amar's argument based on attaint is that 
he ignores such difficulties with the conclusory assertion that Amend­
ment 2 burdens persons "for who they are." Amendment 2 "attaints" 
persons only if the ratifiers of Amendment 2 knew the identity of all 
persons burdened by Amendment 2. But Colorado voters could have 
such knowledge only if the "status" of homosexual orientation were 
"irreversible, "36 such that it defined a group with fixed and unchanging 
membership. Amar offers no reason to believe that the phrase "homo­
sexual . . .  orientation," contained in Amendment 2 pierces the veil of 
legislative ignorance by denoting such a group. 
Instead, Amar relies on a different theory to explain how Amend­
ment 2 is an attaint: he invokes the distinction between "status" and 
"conduct." According to Amar, the Attainder Clauses forbid distinc­
tions based on status while allowing distinctions based on conduct. 
Thus, a racial classification that burdens racial groups constitutes an il­
legal attainder because race is a sort of status rather than a sort of con­
duct: "[a racial classification] targets specific persons for who they are 
- it penalizes them for their status, not their conduct. "37 Likewise, 
laws depriving persons of protection from discrimination on the basis of 
gay or lesbian "orientation" also are attaints because they burden per­
sons based on their propensities or inclinations - again, a type of sta­
tus - and, therefore, "target[] persons for who they are, not for what 
they have done. "38 
There are, however, two problems with using the status-conduct 
distinction to explain the scope of the Attainder Clauses. First, the dis­
tinction between status and conduct is simply irrelevant to the Attainder 
Clauses' meaning. Second, if Amar considers desires and propensities 
to be a sort of "status," then the distinction between status and conduct 
is simply a normatively implausible line to draw. 
large numbers of visible gay men and lesbians in society, the media, and the schools, 
will have no influence on the sexual identity of the young, are wrong."); Janet E. Hal­
ley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from 
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 529-46 (1994). 
35. See Evans v. Romer, Civ. A. No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at 11 (Colo. 
Dist Ct Dec. 14, 1993), affd., 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd., 116 S. Ct. 1620 
(1996). 
36. Cf. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 
841, 851 (1984). 
37. Amar, supra note 1, at 215; see id. at 223. 
38. Id. at 217. 
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Consider the meaning of the Attainder Clauses. The status-conduct 
distinction is simply irrelevant to these clauses' prohibition on the legis­
lative specification of persons by name: the clauses forbid conduct­
based distinctions that specifically designate persons or groups, and 
they permit status-based distinctions that do not specifically designate 
persons or groups. So, for instance, even conduct-based distinctions are 
forbidden when they designate specific persons based on those persons' 
past conduct such as their support for the Confederacy during the Civil 
War39 or for their joining the Communist Party of the United States.40 
Likewise, status-based distinctions are not attaints if they do not desig­
nate any closed class with an easily ascertainable membership. For in­
stance, although age is a sort of "status" or personal trait, age-based 
classifications are not attaints because the membership of age-based 
classes continually changes.41 
Much of Amar's reliance on the status-conduct distinction seems to 
be rooted in a concern that government not criminalize mental states or 
propensities alone, a concern that Amar finds reflected in Robinson v. 
California42 and the "bedrock tenet" that "punishment can occur only 
after offending conduct: it cannot be a crime simply to be, or merely to 
think or feel. "43 But Robinson is a precedent interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments," not Ar­
ticle I's prohibition on attainder. Unless the concept of attaints is coter­
minous with the concept of "cruel and unusual punishments," this ar­
gument is a non sequitur. 
Put more generally, however cruel and unusual it might be to pun­
ish people based on their thoughts alone, why would one think that the 
Attainder Clauses address this particular evil? So long as the govern­
ment metes out such punishment impartially, without specifically 
designating groups or persons by name or the equivalent, there is no at­
taint - that is, no piercing of the legislative veil of ignorance. If homo­
sexuality is an inclination to which any person is prone - as the propo­
nents of Amendment 2 seemed to maintain - then the cruelty of 
Amendment 2 is an impartial cruelty that does not violate Article I's at­
tainder clauses. 
Moreover, why should one assume that the government cannot dis­
courage inclinations through civil burdens just because the Eighth 
39. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
40. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
41. Amar admits this point. See Amar, supra note 1, at 233. 
42. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
43. Amar, supra note 1, at 218. 
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Amendment prohibits the government from criminalizing them? It is 
commonplace for Anglo-American law to place obstacles in the way of 
criminal prosecutions (grand jury indictment and extraordinary burdens 
of proof, for example) that it waives for even punitive civil proceedings 
(civil forfeiture, for example). Why is Robinson v. California's require­
ment of an actus reus not precisely such an obstacle? While Robinson 
forbids the government from criminalizing drug addiction, it certainly 
does not bar the state from, say, refusing to hire drug addicts to drive 
subway trains.44 It might be the case that the King cannot try me for 
treason if I privately wish him to drop dead, but surely the King can re­
fuse to hire me as a bodyguard if he discovers through reading my diary 
that I harbor such a sentiment - even if such refusal has the purpose 
and effect of stigmatizing assassins for their murderous thoughts. 
Aside from the formal objection that a status-conduct distinction 
seems to have nothing whatsoever to do with the Attainder Clauses, 
there is the further practical objection that the distinction seems norma­
tively groundless - indeed, trivial. Propensities are closely related to 
intentional conduct: if one wants to affect intentional conduct, then one 
generally tries to affect propensities. And one way that the government 
uses to change propensities is to stigmatize them. As Judge Silberman 
explained in the recent Steffan45 en bane opinion for the D.C. Circuit, if 
the state legitimately may proscribe same-sex sexual contact as immoral 
or antisocial or otherwise undesirable, it is not obvious why the govern­
ment cannot also take measures to stigmatize propensities that tend to 
lead to the undesirable conduct. 46 
Thus, the law routinely imposes stigmatic burdens on persons 
based on their "character" - another term for propensity. Innumerable 
state statutes, for instance, require that applicants for occupational li­
censes for virtually every licensed occupation prove that they have 
"good moral character."47 And, like any other employer, the govern­
ment cares deeply about the propensities of its prospective employees. 
44. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1979). Of 
course, one might argue that such status-based discrimination might survive strict scru­
tiny. But why should it have to undergo such scrutiny in the first place? Neither text nor 
precedent suggests that the Eighth Amendment even presumptively prohibits the gov­
ernment from considering persons' temperament or inclinations - their "status" - in 
drawing distinctions in civil contexts like public employment. 
45. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
46. See 41 F.3d at 685-90. 
47. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-5-116.2(c) (1991) (law student intern must 
have "good moral character"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-7-102(2)(c) (1991) (bail bonds­
man must show that he is a person of "good moral character"); COLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 12-9-107(21) (1991) (caller or assistant at bingo parlor must be "of good moral char­
acter"); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-39-106(1) (1991) (applicant for license as nursing 
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For instance, the faculty at any public law school would be predictably 
interested in the temperament, predilections, and general character of 
any candidate for a teaching position. If such a candidate sincerely an­
nounced that she hated to write law review articles, then this revelation 
of her propensities would surely count against her - regardless of her 
otherwise stellar prior conduct. 
This is not to deny that it might be more precise for the laws to 
operate on the basis of specifically described conduct rather than status. 
So, for instance, if a state were to adopt an employment policy docking 
the pay of public employees who are "smokers " and requiring them to 
attend seminars on the dangers of tobacco, one might reasonably com­
plain that the state should instead dock the pay and impose the classes 
on "people who routinely smoke" - that is, to burden some pattern Qf 
smoking "conduct " rather than the "status " of being a smoker. But this 
is surely a distinction without much normative significance because the 
status of being a smoker manifests itself solely through visible behavior 
like smoking: the status is just a shorthand for the conduct. 
If the Attainder Clauses simply require that the government ex­
press "status" terms ( "smoker " or "gay person") as "conduct " terms 
( "person who regularly smokes " or "person who regularly engages in 
homosexual conduct, relationships, or practices "), then the clauses are 
unusually trivial in their effects. Under this view of the attainder provi­
sions, Colorado could save Amendment 2 simply by dropping the term 
"orientation, " or construing it to mean "manifest orientation, " and con­
tinue to forbid the state from providing protection from discrimination 
on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual conduct, practices, or 
relationships." It is difficult to see why this would accomplish anything 
of significance, however, especially given that the Colorado Supreme 
Court construed the terms "orientation" and "conduct " to "provide[] 
nothing more than a different way of identifying the same class of 
persons. "48 
At bottom, it is the triviality of the status-conduct distinction that 
is the strongest objection to the distinction's continuing use in litigation 
and debate over the rights of gays and lesbians. For gays and lesbians 
are not interested in merely "being gay " (whatever that means): they 
are interested in engaging in conduct: making love, forming relation­
ships, dating, displaying photos of partners in the workplace, wearing 
wedding rings, living together in rental units, holding hands in public, 
home administrator must "submit evidence of good moral character"); CoLO. REv. 
STAT. § 12-61-103(3) (1991) (real estate broker must have "good moral character"). 
48. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1349-50 (Colo. 1994), affd., 116 S. Ct 1620 
(1996). 
250 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:236 
and otheiwise expressing desire, affection, and commitment. Likewise, 
the proponents of Amendment 2 and other opponents of what they term 
"the gay life-style" are not simply interested in persecuting persons for 
their inner thoughts and desires; they are interested in suppressing any 
public manifestations of homosexuality through public and private ac­
tion. To bar the state from burdening gay or lesbian "orientation" while 
allowing the state to burden gay or lesbian "conduct, practices, and re­
lationships" is to accomplish nothing of practical significance: it is to 
give gay and lesbian persons the right to stay silent in the closet - a 
"right" they already have, as a practical matter. 
· 
III. 
In sum, neither the Attainder Clauses nor the status-conduct dis­
tinction justify the holding of the Romer Court. Indeed, throughout the 
entire text of the Romer opinion, there is not a single mention of the 
distinction between status and conduct. Is there a better argument 
against the constitutionality of Amendment 2? 
I believe that there is, based not on the target of the law but the 
breadth of the law. Moreover, I believe that this is the argument upon 
which the Romer Court actually relied. Amendment 2 is such a sweep­
ing burden that one can attribute to it only a purpose of inflicting harm 
for harm's sake, of gratuitously branding persons with a status of 
inferiority. 
First, consider the language of Romer. The Court's opinion is fo­
cused intensely on the breadth of the measure - Amendment 2's 
"[s]weeping and comprehensive" removal of legal protections. 49 Ac­
cording to the Court, Amendment 2 "impos[es] a broad and undifferen­
tiated disability on a single named group" and "its sheer breadth is so 
discontinuous with the [legitimate] reasons offered for it" that it must 
violate equal protection principles.so While other laws have burdened 
persons, the Court distinguishes such cases by noting that the laws in 
such cases "were narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient 
factual context" to serve a legitimate purpose. s1 By contrast, Amend­
ment 2 is unconstitutional because, after identifying persons by a single 
trait, it "denies them protection across the board," by "declaring that 
in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens . . .  to seek 
aid from the government. "S2 The Romer Court concludes that: 
49. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625. 
50. 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added). 
51. 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added). 
52. 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added). 
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Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that gays 
and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law, in­
flicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and 
belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it. . . . The 
breadth of [Amendment 2] is so far removed from ... particular [legiti­
mate] justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.53 
In other words, the breadth of the disabilities imposed by Amendment 2 
is at the core of the Court's opinion. 
Amar's analysis based on the concept of attaint ignores this p"erva­
sive language concerning Amendment 2's breadth, for the narrowest at­
taint is still unconstitutional. A law barring "Akhil Amar" from hold­
ing the post of town dog catcher would still violate the Attainder 
Clauses. Under Amar's analysis, the breadth of Amendment 2 is simply 
irrelevant, but it was obviously crucial to the Romer Court's analysis. 
Contrary to Amar, I think that the Court's discussion of "status­
based enactment" is best understood as referring not to Amendment 2's 
reference to "orientation" but rather to this extraordinary breadth. 
Amendment 2 was a status-based enactment because the disabilities im­
posed by it were so broad that they can only be understood as an effort 
to impose "disfavored legal status." Indeed, the Court uses the terms 
"disfavored legal status'' and "general hardships" interchangeably 
when it states that "laws singling out a certain class of citizens for dis­
favored legal status or general hardships are rare."54 In short, Romer is 
centrally concerned with Amendment 2's "indiscriminate imposition of 
inequalities,"55 and not its imposition of burdens based on sexual orien­
tation as opposed to conduct. 
Why might the breadth of Amendment 2 render it unconstitu­
tional? Amendment 2 was a rather extraordinary law - "unprece­
dented," in the Court's phrase. To paraphrase Amendment 2's text: 
neither the state of Colorado nor any of its departments or subdivisions 
can create any law or policy "whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, relationships, or practices shall constitute or other­
wise be the basis of . . . any claim of discrimination. "56 It was undis­
puted by the State of Colorado that this amendment barred state and lo­
cal policies and rules that specifically protected gay and lesbian persons 
even from discrimination by state actors or by otherwise pervasively 
regulated persons - for example, lawyers, utilities, insurers. So, for in-
53. 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (emphasis added). 
54. 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added). 
55. 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quot­
ing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))). 
56. COLO. CONST., art. II, § 30(b). 
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stance, there was no dispute that Amendment 2 preempted a one­
sentence executive order promulgated by Governor Romer forbidding 
discrimination against state employees on the basis of their sexual 
orientation. 
Therefore, at the very least, Amendment 2 must have barred state 
and local governments from promulgating policies or regulations ex­
pressly declaring that sexual orientation is a forbidden ground for draw­
ing distinctions, even when discrimination on the basis of sexual orien­
tation really would. be arbitrary and illegal discrimination under state 
law. One can assume, with the Romer Court and Justice Scalia's dissent, 
that Amendment 2 would not have barred the state from enforcing a 
general policy against "arbitrary" governmental discrimination by for­
bidding specific acts of discrimination based on gay or lesbian sexual 
orientation where such acts were, in fact, "arbitrary" under state law. 
But Amendment 2 must have meant that, if some subdivision or branch 
of the government wished specifically to declare in a general rule, regu­
lation, or policy that discrimination specifically on the basis of sexual 
orientation were arbitrary in some specific context, such a declaration 
of policy would be forbidden by Amendment 2 - even where such dis­
crimination would, in fact, be arbitrary. 
So, for instance, suppose that state law forbids police officers from 
generally acting arbitrarily in the execution of their duties. If the police 
chief of Denver were to issue a written "policy" stating that police of­
ficers could not refuse to provide back-up assistance to lesbian and gay 
police officers on the basis of their sexual orientation, then Amendment 
2 would have barred that promulgation of such a policy. This is not to 
· say that Amendment 2 would have prevented the police chief from or­
dering a specific officer to quit harassing gay and lesbian fellow of­
ficers, but, like the Governor of Colorado, the police chief could not ex­
pressly declare to the entire force in a general rule that discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation was, in fact, arbitrary.57 
What could possibly be the legitimate purpose of such a limit on 
the state's rulemaking capacity? To encourage police officers, govern-
57. Lest one argue that this construction of Amendment 2 is tendentious, keep in 
mind that, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, the voter education pamphlet, the 
proponents of Amendment 2, and the state of Colorado, Amendment 2 would have 
overruled the Governor's Executive Order forbidding discrimination against state em­
ployees on the basis of sexual orientation. State employees are covered by the state's 
general rules against arbitrary discrimination: they can be fired only for just cause. If 
Amendment 2 trumped the Governor's executive order, then mutatis mutandis it 
trumped any policy that would make specific any general prohibition against arbitrary 
discrimination by declaring that discrimination against gay and lesbian persons is, in 
fact, arbitrary. 
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ment supervisors, or building inspectors to violate state law? To keep 
gay and lesbian persons ignorant of the state-law rights that the state 
admits gay and lesbian persons retain? If discrimination against gay and 
lesbian persons is really illegal under state law - because it is deemed 
to be arbitrary state action by the state civil service commission, for in­
stance - then surely the state ought to be able to say so. 
It seems to me that the Romer Court simply held that such a blan­
ket prohibition on protective policies can only be motivated by animos­
ity toward the persons stripped of protection and not any legitimate 
governmental purpose. Remember the minimal duty of impartiality: no 
law can impose burdens on persons based solely on those persons' 
identity - on the fact that the burden of a law is felt by A rather than 
B. Put another way, a legislative classification must do more than de­
fine the group that is burdened: it must also justify the burden imposed. 
The breadth of Amendment 2's burdens defies justification except 
as an expression of generalized hostility toward gay and lesbian per­
sons. By the State's own admission, discrimination on the basis of ho­
mosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation or conduct might be arbitrary 
some of the time. Amendment 2, however, inexplicably precluded rules 
and policies that specifically remedies such discrimination all of the 
time - even in contexts where sexual orientation was completely irrel­
evant to the State's own legitimate interests. 
Perhaps such a broad exclusion of rules and policies might have 
been justified as a prophylactic rule if there were some indication that a 
narrower policy might not accomplish the aims of the State. But the 
State never offered the Court any such prophylactic justification for 
why Amendment 2 should paint :with such a broad brush, and it is hard 
to imagine such a rationale. As the Romer Court noted, the remarkable 
aspect of Amendment 2 was its imposition of "general hardships" on 
persons. Whether those persons are defined by conduct or status, impo­
sition of such "undifferentiated" disabilities "is not within our constitu­
tional tradition": such "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities"58 
seems so gratuitous that it can only be explained as "a classification of 
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection 
Clause does not permit. "59 
Such a theory of Romer based on the breadth of Amendment 2's 
burdens requires more explanation than· space permits in this forum. In 
particular, it requires one to answer Justice Scalia's charge that, under 
Salerno, one cannot strike down Amendment 2 based on its unconstitu-
58. Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1628. 
59. 116 S. Ct at 1628. 
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tional breadth in the context of a facial challenge.60 However, such a 
breadth-based theory better explains both the Romer Court's decision 
and the unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 than the theory proposed 
by Professor Amar based on the Attainder Clauses. And, incidentally, it 
is precisely such a "rational basis" based on the breadth of Amendment 
2's burdens that plaintiff-respondents pressed in their brief filed with 
the Court. 
60. See 116 S. Ct. at 1632. 
